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In this contribution on conscience, I shall be largely limiting my discourse to the etymological
term itself ‘conscientia’, or the ‘application of knowledge to activity’ (Summa Theologiae, I-II,
19, 5–6). That is, I will not be saying much about the correlative term synderesis although I will
be making some reference to the connection between synderesis and conscientia at the end of
my paper.
Synderesis, of course, is the divine spark or the basic notion of ‘good’ which is ‘written’ or
‘implanted’ in us. Peter Lombard, in his Sentences quotes Jerome’s interpretation of the eagle
in the vision in Ezekiel 1, 4–14 as that ‘which the Greeks call synteresis (synderesis): that spark
of conscience which was not even extinguished in the breast of Cain after he was turned out of
paradise, and by which we discern that we sin, when we are overcome by pleasures or frenzy
and meanwhile are misled by an imitation of reason’.1 Hence, the role of synderesis is
that of
an original memory of the good and true (both are identical) [which] has been implanted in us;
[. . . .] there is an inner ontological tendency within man, who is created in the likeness of God,
toward the divine. . . . This anamnesis of the origin, which results from the godlike constitution
of our being is not a conceptually articulated knowing, a store of retrievable contents. It is so
to speak an inner sense, a capacity to recall, so that the one whom it addresses, if he is not
turned in on himself, hears its echo from within. He sees: ‘That’s it! That is what my nature
points to and seeks.’2
Synderesis may be largely obfuscated but this natural dispostion of the human person
towards the good is never completely extinguished. Its presence in the human person invariably
points to the human desire to seek the good, to transcend the limits of sin and corruption, and
to strive for union with God. Synderesis is to be associated with the ontological disposition
essential to the apprehension of eternal truths which ultimately lead the human person closer
to God.
Having considered, all too briefly, the level of synderesis, the function of conscientia is that
of judging and deciding in the particular situation.3 While synderesis has to do with ratio
superior or the capacity to apprehend universal and eternal truths by which the human person,
as a rational creature, shares to some degree in the ‘. . . guidance of created things on the part
of God’,4 conscientia has to do with the ratio inferior involved in particular judgments in
concrete situations. The link between the two ‘levels’ is interesting: one could insist that the
connection could be brought out by a syllogism where synderesis embodies the axiom of natural
law (the major premise), a factual situation is provided (the minor premise), and the conclusion
(being the judgment itself) is identified with conscientia. However, such an understanding
would be rather reductive in that the moral life would be reduced to nothing but an arid,
mechanistic application of the moral code.
Now, it is interesting that Thomas Aquinas, in speaking of synderesis and conscientia, links
the latter to prudence and the development of the virtues in general through his concern with
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weakness of the will.5 This tendency to link conscience with prudence, in Aquinas, is highly
significant: according to Aquinas, conscientia is connected to the correct perception of
individual circumstances which is, in turn, dependent on the person’s moral character. This
means that, primarily, the moral life has to do with the endeavour to perform the good
knowingly and willingly rather than with actions governed by the fear of punishment. It also
means that, although all human persons have the inner sense of synderesis, only those who have
the virtue of prudence possess right conscience. Finally, it also points towards an ethical
fellowship between God and humanity where conscience is considered to be the act whereby the
human person, in consonance with the Creator, fulfils his or her own proper ethical end through
his or her own exercise of reason.
The key to the Thomist understanding of prudence is the Aristotelian notion of the
so-called ‘practical syllogism’. Now, this is a hugely complex issue of which I shall only be
giving, here, a general overview. Aristotle notes that, like the theoretical syllogism, the prac-
tical syllogism consists in two kinds of premises. The first is a major premise that pertains to
something wanted, or needed, or good, and is universal in that it shows that such and such
a kind of man should do such and such a kind of act.6 The second is a minor premise that
relates to the particular or factual situational aspects of what, the person can see, falls under
the major premise. In different places, he notes that premises (in practical matters) are of two
kinds, universal and particular,7 and that ‘premises of action are of two kinds, of the good and
of the possible’.8 The parallel between the theoretical and practical syllogisms is drawn out
further when he insists that:
The one opinion is universal, the other is concerned with the particular facts, and here we
come to something within the sphere of perception; when a single opinion results from the
two, the soul must in one type of case [theoretical reasoning] affirm the conclusion, while
in the case of opinions concerned with production [practical reasoning] it must immediately
act.9
Hence, the two premises in the practical syllogism represent a logical structure that concep-
tualizes the dynamic structure of the soul. The conclusions or actions ‘are the expression of
deliberative desire which is the result of the coalescing of desire . . . with the reasoning set out
in the premises’.10 The major premise expresses an inclination or want while the minor premise
expresses some (constituent or productive) means related to the good wanted.
Now, once again, this approach could well appear to be one where ‘practical principles
form a closed, consistent deductive system, beginning with a priori first principles concerning
the essence or nature of man’, where the system is notable for its lack of freedom since,
from the a priori first principles, there follows ‘a closed, consistent hierarchy of rules of
practice, covering both the moral and non-moral sides of human life, down to the smallest
details: the decision to eat some candy, the need to make a cloak’. In deciding what to do,
one need only ‘subsume the situation under the relevant rule, plug it into the right place in
the hierarchy’.11
However, such an approach is largely not tenable. One must consider that an important
formal feature of the practical syllogism is that it proceeds in a very different direction from
theoretical reasoning.12 Indeed, a standard deductive – that is, theoretical – syllogism proceeds
in a ‘downward direction’, namely, from its major term through the middle term, to the minor
term where the ‘holding conduit’ between the major and the minor terms is necessary. The
point, clearly, is to nail down the inescapable truth in the particular instance: if warmth holds of
every covering and covering holds of every cloak, then warmth holds of every cloak and no
cloak would be exempt from this necessary truth. Hence, the direction is as follows:
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In a practical syllogism, the direction is different. For here, the movement conducive to
getting at the good – that is, the major term – proceeds from the minor term, though the middle,
and to the major, term. Here, the reasoning runs more like: covering leads to warmth, cloak
leads to covering, the cloak leads to warmth. The direction is teleological:
This comparison makes it clear that the point of theoretical and of practical syllogisms is
different. In the first case, the point of the rules is to ensure that that one never passes from true
assertions to false assertions; theoretical syllogisms are ‘truth-preserving’. The concern of
practical syllogisms appears to be different; they aim at ensuring that one gets to where one
wants to. Practical reasoning establishes a link between a goal and an action in such a manner
that one achieves one’s goal; it seeks to ensue that the goodness sought is preserved in the
conclusion that is the decision to adopt the means.13 For, commonly, one finds oneself in a
position where one must choose, among possible courses of action, one which would be most
suitable in order to serve one’s purpose and achieve it. The function of the rules of practical
reasoning is to ensure that one does not pass from a plan of action that is adequate to achieve
one’s goals to one which is inadequate. And it is important to see that just as the agent cannot
have any intention whatsoever – his intention must fall within a possible human practice in
order to be intelligible – it does not depend on the agent as to which of the courses of action are
compatible with, or effective of, the achievement of his purpose. Independently of the agent,
certain plans are more satisfactory to certain purposes than others; also independently of the
agent, certain plans would just be incompatible with his or her purposes.14
Such considerations led Anthony Kenny to suggest that the logic operative in practical
reasoning is the ‘logic of satisfactoriness’.15 Hence, the rules of practical reasoning would be
satisfactoriness-preserving, ensuring that one does not pass, from a plan of action which is
satisfactory, to one which is unsatisfactory for that purpose. This means, of course, that a plan
is satisfactory relative to a given set of wants. And in this it is different from the truth-preserving
logic of theoretical syllogisms: while truth and falsehood are absolute notions, a plan of action
can be satisfactory for some purposes but not for others.
This logic of satisfactoriness, which is held by Richard M. Hare to be re-describable as a
logic of sufficient conditions,16 turns out to be exactly isomorphic to the logic of inference to the
best explanation, or inductive logic, in the theoretical sphere. This parallel is exciting because
it clearly brings out the fact that, just as something is not an explanation simpliciter and absolute
but is an explanation of a given set of data, some action is not satisfactory simpliciter and
absolute but is satisfactory given a set of wants.17 And, just as a theory that had been adequate
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to explain a given set of data may cease to be adequate when new data are added, in practical
reasoning, if one were to add new wants or new contexts or new extraneous factors in general
(say, in the ‘cloak’ example, if one were to see that all the available cloth from which cloaks
could be made was badly moulded), one could not be sure that the conclusion would remain
satisfactory (in the changed circumstances, one could, for instance, choose to use a blanket as
a covering, provided it is available and suitable). This characteristic of practical reasoning is
referred to as its defeasibility.18
This defeasibility, or looseness, in practical reasoning is manifest in a number of manners, all
of which, once again, show the distinction between reasons and mechanistic causes. For
instance, the fact that a pattern of reasoning, which would justify a certain course of action,
would cease to justify it if further wants are brought in as premises of the practical reasoning,
would be dealt with, by one who claimed that, say, beliefs and desires are quasi-mechanical
causes of actions, as an exemplar of causal interference. That is, he would hold that the new
premises are expressions of causal factors that interfere mechanically with the causality of the
wants expressed by the original premises. However, when there are conflicts between wants in
the sense that an action that would lead to the satisfaction of one would lead to the frustration
of the other, what happens is not a result in the sense of a vector product of all the tendencies
so that, if nothing happens at all, the ‘nothing’ may be the sum of equal and opposite actual
effects.19 What happens is, rather, a choice of one of the possible actions, normally for a reason,
or, if at all possible, an attempt at a harmonious satisfaction of a number of wants so that a
different conclusion might be reached in which the wider set of wants is satisfied.
The looseness in the practical syllogism is also manifest in the fact that, unlike in the case of
deductive theoretical reasoning where the same premises cannot lead to incompatible conclu-
sions, in practical reasoning, the same reasons can accommodate different and jointly incom-
patible conclusions. Hence, the beliefs and desires of the agent in the ‘cloak’ example could be
reasons for a wide range of actions – such as making a cloak, making a blanket, borrowing some
clothes, stealing them, making a fire and so forth – some of which are jointly incompatible.
Here a Leibnizian objection could be that, if practical reasoning can lead to jointly incom-
patible conclusions, then the agent could have no sufficient reason to choose one, rather than
another, conclusion. However, such an objection betrays the tendency of thinking of reasons as
mechanistic causes and, just as in the case of vector analysis, would have the burden of
explaining why human agents are not more often, and irredeemably, in the equivalent of the
excruciating dilemma of Buridan’s ass. Indeed, human dilemmas are provoked by not knowing
what to do rather than being tugged at by equal and opposite forces. Human beings normally act
for reasons. The claim that one has a reason for what one is doing is not weakened, as an
explanation, by the fact that there are other, equally good, if not better, ways of achieving the
same purpose or that one could act on other, more worthy, purposes. Reasons do not necessitate
as mechanical causes do.
This looseness in practical reasoning means that one can take exception to an instance of
practical reasoning at a number of levels, where, if any of the objections work, the practical
syllogism would fail to ensue into action, though not on account of any fault in the practical
calculation. One may, for example, come to hold the desirability characteristic unworthy or even
false as might happen when a person deceives himself into thinking that he is finally pursuing
something good, which good is only illusory. Indeed, practical reasoning is concerned with
issues of truth. For, if intentional actions are actions under a description, then the concepts of
truth and falsity apply to actions strictly and properly. On one level, the agent normally makes
true the descriptions of what he or she does, under which he or she does them. On the ethical
level, practical truth is produced when the judgement is true and the wanting right; that is, ‘truth
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in agreement with right desire’20 brought about when one forms and executes a good choice.
Hence the person who makes bad choices may be committing errors of thought. He or she will
have produced practical falsehood, for the description, say, that he or she has performed justice
would be false.21
Of course, what might also happen is that other wants are introduced into the context within
which the practical reasoning is performed. Moreover, it might be the case that one may come
to see that the action proposed falls under another description than the one being considered,
which description highlights the undesirability of the action. Here it is interesting, and impor-
tant, to note the multiplicity of aspects of the good as possible answers to the question ‘What
is the good of that? ’ or, as Anscombe had put it, ‘Why?’. The point is that, while bivalency is
a feature of truth-functional logic, an action that is seen to have the value of ‘good’, for given
reasons, may also come to be seen to have the value ‘bad’, for other reasons.
In all this, it is clear that practical reasoning is predominantly not a deductive type of reasoning.
Perhaps Aristotle’s comparison of calculation in practical reasoning with the ancient Greek
method of geometrical analysis (analuiς)22 could prove illuminating.23 This parallel is
manifest in that, in practical reasoning, the agent posits the action in the context within which he
or she is embedded, in the light of the end or want desired. Hence, in analysis, as it were, one
works outside the deductive flow; one starts from the desired end and moves from one view of the
broader context, to another in turn and so forth, in the direction of the agent and his or her
possibilities, where each ‘step’ is related to and not inconsistent with the previous one. Just as
what is analysed in geometric analysis is not the deductive step from axioms and earlier theorems
to the desired result, but is the geometrical configuration of the figure – that is the result – in terms
of the myriad interdependencies of the different geometrical entities that make it up, in practical
reason, what are analysed are the myriad interrelations of the practical elements in the contextual
circumstances in terms of the logically prior end, or purpose, of the agent.
It is significant that Aristotle speaks here of a hypothetical starting-point of deliberation in
terms of its aim (teloς) and describes how one tries to reason ‘backwards’, in the light of the
aim, to ways and means to bring this about. It is also significant that he appears to draw a
parallel between the auxiliary constructions which one posits in order to solve, analytically, a
geometrical problem, and where there is no possible a priori guarantee of success, and the
means (organa) by which the desired result is to be brought about.24 Also significant is the
weight Aristotle gives to the claim that the proper state of the practical intellect (jronhiς) is
akin to a perceptual capacity (aiqhiς):
[P]ractical reason (jronhiς) is concerned with the ultimate particular (tou ecatou),
which is the object not of scientific knowledge (epithmh) but of perception (aiqhiς) – not
the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to that by which we
perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle; for in that direction as well as in that
of the major premiss there will be a limit. But this is rather perception than practical wisdom,
though it is another kind of perception than that of the qualities peculiar to each sense.25
[W]hen we speak of judgement and understanding and practical wisdom and intuitive
reason we credit the same people with possessing judgement and having reached years of
reason and with having practical wisdom and understanding. For all these faculties deal with
ultimates, i.e. with particulars; and being a man of understanding and of good or sympathetic
judgement consists in being able to judge about the things with which practical wisdom is
concerned . . . Now all things which have to be done are included among particulars or
ultimates; for not only must the man of practical wisdom know particular facts, but under-
standing and judgement are also concerned with things to be done, and these are ultimates . . .
the intuitive reason involved in practical reasonings grasps the last and variable fact, i.e. the
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minor premise. For these variable facts are the starting-points for the apprehension of the end,
since the universals are reached from the particulars; of these therefore we must have percep-
tion, and this perception is intuitive reason (nouς).26
Indeed, as Hintikka and Remes point out, the distinctive feature is not so much the direction
of reasoning: in the geometrical sense, it is not so much one’s passage from one proposition to
another that is in play; in a way, it can be said that analysis has no direction.27 Rather, what is
central to analysis is the fact that analytic reasoning uses the starting-point, that is the desired
result, in the reasoning itself by analysing the dynamic interrelations and interdependencies of
the elements involved in the geometrical figure with reference to which the proof of the desired
theorem is to be carried out. Thus far, the parallel in practical reasoning is that one views the
way things are in one’s corner of the world in the light of one’s wants. That is, one sees in this
complex (i.e. non-linear) network of connections what is of practical significance and what is
of no such significance in one’s situation. One looks on one’s situation as a practical one where
one sees what the network of dynamic interrelations and interdependencies of the practical
elements around one is, and how it could (practically) work.
Of course, there are a number of situations where the premises setting out the goods are
complete, that is, there could be no further wants that could slight the satisfactoriness of the
action. This could happen in, for example, the case of absolute negative prohibitions that one
upholds in such a way that they silence all other possible considerations such as ‘One ought
never to directly kill an innocent person’. Other examples of such delimitation of wants could
occur within the ambit of particular skills or arts (what Aristotle called tecnai) like the art of
medicine, where one could have general positive rules that approach completeness to a suffi-
cient degree to prevent most – though not all – cases of defeasibility, while they are specific
enough to entail practical conclusions. Hence, within the restricted context, they would stipulate
that one should always do such-and-such, or insist that doing such-and-such is always good or
suitable or useful (even here, such a rule could be hedged by considerations like ‘unless it would
be foolish in the circumstances’). In such circumstances, one is reasoning to necessary condi-
tions in practical contexts, which kind of reasoning is isomorphic to deductive theoretical
reasoning. In a technical arena like medicine, for instance, a doctor might well agonize about
the specific treatment to administer to a particular patient in a difficult case but, in most cases,
she will not need to do so. Indeed, certain procedures in crafts and technical practices, and
certain virtues in a person’s life, demand that certain facts count for nothing in the situation.
Such could happen, for example, in a situation where the courageous agent sees that the
likelihood of suffering grievous injury is silenced in the face of the defence of the innocent
against an aggressor.28
However, there obviously are situations where the practically relevant facts are only dimly
recognized by the agent and, as it were, she needs to peer more closely in order to see what to
do. Indeed, in a good number of cases of moral reasoning, what determines the concern on
which a person acts in the one case is that some of the potentially relevant aspects of the
situation – rather than others – strike the person as what is pertinent in the situation. Apart from
the scope of the aforementioned negative prohibitions, and cases within the restricted context of
specific arts or sciences, the agent cannot rest assured that, by carrying out a piece of practical
reasoning to its necessary conditions and acting accordingly, there is not more he or she must
do in order to achieve his or her goals.
What is interesting here is that the particular selection of specific features of the situation
from among others as significant manifests the specific shape of the practical intellect or
jronhiς. Once again, this is often not a deductive process; it is not a question of possessing
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a particular framework or theory that allows particular conclusions to be deduced from its
premises in conjunction with particular facts afforded by a cine-camera-like capacity. Rather,
the proper state of the practical intellect or jronhiς is a perceptual capacity which means that
the deliverances of one’s perception are intertwined with the moulding or shaping of one’s
perceptual intellect. It forms a background to the way one speaks, thinks, acts, and what one
calls good reasons.
Aquinas clearly concurs with this interpretation. He notes that:
Other intellectual virtues, but not prudence, can exist without moral virtue. The reason for this
is that prudence is right judgment about things to be done, and this not merely in general, but
also in the particular instance, wherein action takes place. Prerequisite for right judgment are
principles from which reason proceeds. Yet when reason is concerned with the particular, it
needs not only universal principles, but also particular ones. So far as the general principles of
practice are concerned, a man is rightly disposed by a natural understanding, by which he
knows that he should do no evil, and by some normative science.Yet this is not enough in order
that a man may reason rightly about particular cases. In fact, it happens sometimes that general
principles and conclusions of understanding and science are swept away in the particular case
by a passion. Thus to one who is overcome by lust, the object of his desire then seems good,
although it is against his general convictions. Consequently, as by the habits of natural
understanding and science, a man is rightly disposed in regard to general truths, so, in order
that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, namely, their ends,
he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes, as it were, connatural to him
to judge rightly about an end. This is done by moral virtue, for the virtuous man judges rightly
of the end of virtue, because, as Aristotle says, “such as a man is, such does the end seem to
him” (Ethic. iii, 5. 1114a32). Consequently, right judgment about things to be done, namely
prudence, requires that a man has moral virtue.29
Aquinas here links prudence with a correct perception of particular circumstances. Although
synderesis continues to provide the agent’s ontological orientation towards the good, its ‘pre-
cepts’ remain rather empty and general. Such principles as ‘Do good and avoid evil’ and ‘obey
God’ need to be fleshed out in more specific ways and also need to be accompanied with an
apprehension of particular circumstances.
This element of situational appreciation, which results in a specific evaluation of the cir-
cumstances, a definite kind of care or concern, and one’s embarkation on specific projects,
means that the agent lives within a certain kind of world where her eyes are opened to certain
kinds of reasons by her acquiring a second nature. In practical reasoning, in the light of the
‘premise of the good’ or the content of the conception of doing well, the description of one
feature, rather than another of the situation, serves as the ‘premise of the possible’.30 In the case
of theoretical reasoning, the ‘major premise’, which is the content of the conception expressed
in one’s world-picture, constitutes part of the very background that forms the ‘ground’ on which
one stands when one judges and in the light of which the descriptions of some features rather
than others, are seen to be pertinent as ‘minor premises’ in one’s investigation. One sees that
such-and-such is what matters in this situation; one notes that one can offer reasons to justify
one’s appreciation only up to a certain point after which one simply says ‘You have to see it!’
to those who have a rather different situational appreciation from one’s own.
The same is true for epikeia which was considered by both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas to
be a moral virtue; the ethical framework within which the concept of epikeia developed is one
where the virtues constitute goals that are stably desired by the virtuous person and that thereby
enable jronhiς to identify, practically connaturally, the particular action to be taken to
achieve those goals. Hence, epikeia belongs to this context of prudent realization of the desired
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goal through virtuous habit. This view means that epikeia is the principle of decisions that are
excellent: in ‘correcting’ the law that ‘sins’ by reason of its universality, epikeia is the perfection
and completion of justice. This, in turn, means that it would be misleading to simply transfer the
concept of epikeia to a normative context where the good is based on law. To say that the moral
norms concerning justice allow for exceptions would be to create confusion; strictly speaking,
epikeia is not a question of kindness, nor does it have to do with tolerance or dispensation. It is
rather a situational appreciation by the just person which means that, in the light of justice, the
description of one situational feature rather than another is seen to be pertinent as the ‘premise
of the possible’.31
This situational appreciation means that our basic relation to the world is not an interpretative
one; rather, it is one of continuous aspect-perception. Our everyday moral experience of the
world is not to be understood as a logical or theoretical construction out of brute data. For, such
an understanding would presuppose that aspect-blindness were the normal human state.
Rather, it is somewhat akin to the manner in which we choose and value words:
How do I find the ‘right’ word? How do I choose among words? Without doubt it is sometimes
as if I were comparing them by fine differences of smell: That is too . . . , that is too . . . , – this
is the right one. – But I do not always have to make judgments, give explanations; often I might
only say: ‘It simply isn’t right yet’. I am dissatisfied, I go on looking. At last a word comes:
‘That’s it!’ Sometimes I can say why. This is simply what searching, this is what finding, is like
here. (PI 218)
Indeed, in many cases of moral reasoning, the lack of hesitation manifested in one’s practices
shows that one has taken certain reasons for actions to heart and assimilated them as part of one’s
second nature when one learns to do and to enjoy them for their own sake; that is, one understands
and appreciates their intrinsic value. One comes to appreciate and act in such-and-such a way
precisely because it is just or noble to do so. If one did not yet assimilate such reasoning as part
of one’s second nature, one would be in the position of attempting to interpret the situation as if
one pursued virtues for their own sake; in deed, one would be acting in such-and-such a manner,
say, in order to escape some form of sanction. That is, such a person could only offer external,
contingent reasons – such as the threat of punishment by an external social order – for acting in
such-and-such a way. In other words, she does not move and act readily and easily. She still feels
that the ‘technique’ she must learn stands between her and the world.
Perhaps we can conclude by reflecting on the position of the akratic or weak-willed person
of whom a rather trivial example could be provided by the diabetic who is swayed to indulge
in a very sweet cake. Here, one could contemplate two different kinds of flaws. One flaw would
regard the content of the akratês’ knowledge of the more specific dictates of practical reasoning
and their application in particular circumstances, the other is a flaw where the akratês’ grasp
itself is defective; it is not yet fully integrated into his or her habituated tendencies with respect
to his or her emotions. Hence, one could contemplate a situation where the content of the
akratês’ practical thinking is correct – in an attenuated sense – with regards to both his general
conception and the choices he ‘sort of’ makes, in knowing that his craving for sweet things has
no practical significance in the present circumstances, and where the akratês nevertheless acts
on his craving. Aristotle for one is committed throughout to conceiving ‘the development of the
state of the practical intellect as inseparable from the development of the proper state of ethical
character’.32 The problem of the akratês is that the practical thinking with the sort of content he
or she is akratic about is not yet fully ingrained into his or her character. The unfortunate result
is that, when one is akratic, one lets oneself be swayed by considerations which one’s own
practical thinking shows to be practically irrelevant in the circumstances.
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Our reflections show that at best we are all journeying towards moral integrity and that our
moral character may be somewhat marred at a number of levels. The case of the akratês
shows a deficiency at a more particular and specific level. But it can very well be the case
that there exists, in the life of an agent, a longer-standing deficiency at a more fundamental
level which makes him or her deaf to certain promptings of goodness and truth and which
means that the agent comes to have askew moral convictions. Of course, the agent must not
act contrary to her conscience but her guilt would lie then in a much deeper place — not in
the present judgment of conscience but in the neglect of her fundamental calling towards
goodness and truth.
The process of moral maturation is to learn to do what is virtuous, that is, to make it a habit
or second nature to come to enjoy doing virtuous actions for their own sake: the virtuous person
has the right dispositions and therefore takes the appropriate pleasure in doing that which is
virtuous. Hence, in the person of virtue and practical wisdom, all responses and evaluations ‘are
integrated . . . [and] infused and corrected by the reasoned scheme of values’,33 in such a way
that ‘the virtuous person’s conception of what is truly pleasant is now shaped by his independ-
ent, reasoned conception of what is good . . . [so that] nothing will tempt or lure him as much
as the temperate . . . action itself.34 Nothing else will seem as pleasurable’.35
Obviously very few of us are like that!
There is, however, a real place for hope in human life. While conscience often indicts justly
and sometimes guiltily fails to indict, the human longing for a truth that pardons and expiates
has been answered in a way that transcends both our capabilities and our incapabilities, both our
hopes and our yearnings. This of course is the centre of the Christian message.
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